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Abstract 
The paper discusses the how Italian Constitutional Court 
(ItCC) considers the case law of the European Court on Human 
Rights (ECtHR) by focusing specifically on the parameters for 
constitutional adjudication. The analysis shows that in some cases, 
the ItCC considers the ECtHR precedents through Art. 117, par. 1, 
It. Const.—i.e. the obligation of the Italian legislation to respect 
international treaties—while in other cases, the ItCC prioritises 
constitutional rights, thus directly adopting an interpretation that 
is consistent with the ECHR. In this way, a silent cooperation 
between courts is executed. Next, this paper attempts to compare 
the French Constitutional Council’s behaviour with Italy’s 
approach to the ECHR. The analysis concludes that the ItCC’s 
choice of parameter seems flexible and unpredictable. More 
specifically, the Italian approach lacks a well-established and 
coherent logical priority towards substantive constitutional 
violations instead of conventional violations. In times of fragility of 
the ECHR machinery, the application of the sole substantive 
constitutional parameter can be explained by constitutional 
patriotism, which pursues autonomy and diversity. However, this 
might also result in the increased legitimacy of the ECHR system, 
rooting it directly in the living Constitution. 
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1. Introduction 
This study addresses the supranational dimension of 
fundamental rights from the perspective of constitutional 
adjudication. Specifically, it considers decisions of the Italian 
Constitutional Court (ItCC) that follow a previous judgement by 
the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR). The focus is on the 
parameters and legal reasoning of constitutional adjudication, to 
explore how the ECtHR case law is taken into consideration. The 
objective is to understand if the ItCC’s behaviour can be viewed as 
a means of unity or plurality towards the protection of human 
rights. 
In 2007, the ItCC identified Art. 117, par. 1, of the Italian 
Constitution as the ‘ECHR article’ and, more generally, as a 
provision that opens the Italian legal system to international human 
rights treaties1. Thus, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) has an ‘intermediate’ status (norma interposta) between 
the law and the Constitution, in that a law violating the Convention 
is indirectly incompatible with Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. and must 
                                                 
1 Article 117, paragraph 1, It. Const.: ‘Legislative powers shall be vested in the 
State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the 
constraints deriving from European Union law and international obligations’. 
Article 117 was reformed by Italian Constitutional Law no. 3 of 2001, introducing 
a specific reference to international obligations. Indeed, a principle of openness 
of the Italian Republic to the international legal order was already provided by 
Articles 10 and 11 It. Const., but no reference was made to international human 
rights treaties and the ECHR itself. 
COZZI – A SILENT UNITY? 
 
 
228 
 
be quashed2. Thus, Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is the key that gives 
the ECHR and ECtHR case law access to the national legal order3. 
A lawyer studying the ItCC case law can probably search for 
Art. 117 It. Const. in a database to extract all ItCC judgements 
concerning the ECHR. However, the list of results would be 
incomplete. Many ItCC judgements recall the ECtHR case law 
without referring to Art. 117 It. Const. and directly incorporate the 
ECtHR reasoning in the substantive constitutional parameter, i.e. 
constitutional rights. 
This study focuses on those cases in which the outcome is 
similar to the one ruled by the ECtHR but lacking a strict and formal 
reference to Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. We will call them the ‘silent 
cases’. We aim at understanding why the ItCC sometimes 
prioritises the substantive constitutional parameter instead of the 
‘ECHR article’ and if this approach is useful in ensuring 
cooperation between the ItCC and the ECtHR. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the term 
‘silence’ in the context of this study. Sections 3 and 4 survey 
different models of the ItCC legal reasoning concerning the 
                                                 
2 The ECHR was signed by the Republic of Italy on 4 November 1950 and ratified 
on 26 October 1955; Italian Law no. 848 of 4 August 1955 incorporated the ECHR 
in Italian legal order with the force of ordinary law. In 1973, Italy recognised the 
competence of ECHR organs to receive individual applications. As of 1 July 2017, 
a total of 5,351 applications against Italy were pending before the ECtHR. In 2016, 
the ECtHR dealt with 2,730 applications concerning Italy, of which 2,695 were 
declared inadmissible or struck out. The ECtHR delivered 15 judgements, ten of 
which found at least one violation of the ECHR. For the country fiche on Italy, 
see http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Italy_ENG.pdf. 
This study does not consider the role of ECHR before the ‘twin’ judgements of 
2007. See G. Martinico, O. Pollicino, Report on Italy, in G. Martinico, O. Pollicino 
(eds.), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Law. A Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective (2010), 271-299, 282-283; D. Tega, The Constitutional 
Background of the 2007 Revolution. The Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, in 
G. Repetto (ed.), The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR in Domestic and European 
Law. An Italian Perspective (2013), 25-36, 26-27. 
3 For the Italian constitutional review of legislation model, see V. Barsotti, P.G. 
Carozza, M. Cartabia, A. Simoncini (eds.), Italian Constitutional Justice in Global 
Justice (2015), especially Chapter II. An English summary of more recent ItCC 
judgements is available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionJudgment.do. For 
an overview of the 2016 ItCC case law, see P. Faraguna, M. Massa, D. Tega, M. 
Cartabia, Developments in Italian Constitutional Law, in R. Albert, D. Landau, P. 
Faraguna, S. Drugda (eds.), 2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I∙CONnect-
Clough Center (2017), 108-113. 
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implementation of the ECHR after 2007. Section 5 presents Italian 
silent cases. Section 6 attempts to compare the coordination 
undertaken by the ItCC and other forms of silent coordination 
executed by the French Constitutional Council. Sections 7 and 8 
examine whether the Italian silent cases are a symptom of a unitary 
or disruptive approach in human rights adjudication. Indeed, the 
priority given to the substantive constitutional parameter may be a 
sign of patriotism—reaffirming the superiority of constitutional 
norms—or a sign of silent cooperation between courts. We argue 
that the ItCC’s behaviour might strengthen, instead of weakening, 
the ECHR system, rooting its legitimacy directly in the 
Constitution. 
 
 
2. Silence: the choice of parameter for constitutional 
adjudication 
In the context of constitutional adjudication, the term 
‘silence’ has been used with different connotations. Silence has been 
used to refer to the informal cooperation between courts effected 
through meetings, official visits and joint seminars. This form of 
cooperation might be meaningful to increase familiarity and share 
knowledge; however, its weight and influence on judicial activity 
cannot be easily measured. In a more formal perspective, which can 
be measured, we use the term ‘silence’ in the context of judicial 
decision-making, focusing on the argumentative tools through 
which the courts refer to each other. 
In this variation, the concept of ‘silent judgement’ has 
already been used to describe a form of judicial cooperation. Daniel 
Sarmiento, for example, used the concept to portray how the ECJ 
and national courts communicate through a preliminary reference 
in the case of conflict on constitutional issues. Sarmiento identified 
three forms of silence: complete silence, wherein the ECJ renders no 
solution to the question posed by the national court; partial silence 
– a form of judicial minimalism, when the ECJ decides in abstracto 
on specific points of law, leaving the concrete answer to the 
referring court; and unheard replies, that is, when national courts 
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have a discretion to set aside decisions of superior national courts 
that quash referring orders4. 
The background of our analysis partly differs from that of 
Sarmiento. Firstly, here, silence refers to a specific part of the legal 
reasoning, i.e. the choice of the parameter for constitutional 
adjudication, and not to all argumentative tools developed by the 
courts. Second, the relationship between the ECtHR and ItCC 
differs from that between the ECJ and national courts. The ECtHR 
and national courts are yet to be connected by any form of 
preliminary reference5. In addition, Sarmiento adopts the 
framework of constitutional pluralism theory, in which both the 
ECJ and national courts claim final authority on issues of 
constitutional relevance such as fundamental rights and 
institutional autonomy and competences6. However, the ECHR 
                                                 
4 D. Sarmiento, The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves. Constitutional Pluralism, 
Preliminary References and the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law, in M. Avbelj, J. 
Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (2012), 
285-317. The premise is that the preliminary reference is a flexible instrument, 
under which the ECJ grants wide discretion when facing interpretative queries. 
In addition, national Courts are more or less free to determine ways in which the 
ECJ answer can be used in the case at hand. In the Author’s view, the case law’s 
approach on issues of constitutional principle placed much importance in ‘the 
way in which the answer is framed, the intensity of its normative content, the 
deference it grants to the referring Court, the need to uniformity and coherence 
… These factors are all balanced through a subtle and complex use of both 
language and silence, in a manner that would fit appropriately in a theory of 
judicial minimalism’. Some legal tools allow the ECJ to discard queries of national 
Courts when the condition required by Article 267 TFUE are not met, such as 
queries that go beyond the boundaries of European Union (EU) law; fictitious or 
hypothetical; not motivated or posed by authorities which do not fall under the 
Treaties’ definition of ‘jurisdiction’. 
5 Protocol No. 16 of the ECHR allows the highest courts and tribunals of a state 
party to request for the ECtHR’s advisory opinions on questions of principle 
relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in 
the convention or protocols thereto. The protocol was opened for signature on 2 
October 2013. Its entry into force is scheduled on August 1, 2018. 
6 Constitutional pluralism is a descriptive and normative legal theory designed 
to resolve claims of authority on issues of constitutional relevance. The main 
descriptive results of the theory in the judicial context are reviewed by D. 
Sarmiento, cit. at 4, 289, as follows. Legal orders in the European Union operate 
under shifting grundnorms, depending on the scope of application of each one. 
Despite the separation among legal systems, the criteria for the resolution of 
constitutional conflicts must be found in mutually enhancing normative texts. 
Litigations find authoritative resolutions that are based on constructive 
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system does not claim any final authority; rather, it is based on 
subsidiarity, complementarity and minimum standards. Thus, the 
claim of final authority does not seem to be a valid descriptive or 
normative background to explain the relationship between the 
ECtHR and national Constitutional Courts7. 
Nevertheless, Sarmiento’s conclusions could be useful in our 
scenario to understand the rationale of judicial cooperation. 
According to Sarmiento, the outcome of an ECJ silent judgement 
from a preliminary reference is ‘complicity’: laconic judgements 
and in abstracto or incomplete answers can protect national judicial 
autonomy and, eventually, the ECJ authority too. An incomplete 
and minimal way of reasoning gives all relevant actors a voice, 
enhancing collaboration and mutual trust: all courts can participate 
                                                 
communication over specific issues and not the competence of one judicial actor 
at play. The outcome is not a consequence of the primacy of national constitutions 
but a system of mutually dependent legal orders that maximise cooperation and 
allow courts to change the grundnorm when conflicts become unsolvable. Further, 
see N. MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 The Modern Law Review (1993), 
1-18; M. Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in 
Action, in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in transition (2003), 501-538; Id, Three Claims 
of Constitutional Pluralism, in M. Avbelj, J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism 
in the European Union and Beyond (2012), 67-84; and Id, In Search of a Meaning and 
not in search of Meaning: Judicial Review and the Constitution in times of Pluralism, 
Wisconsin Law Review 2 (2013), 541-563, especially 545-549, 556. 
7 Dealing with EU law, recently in judgement no. 269 of 14 December 2017, the 
ItCC seemed to reconsider the ‘Granital’ doctrine. Since the Granital judgement 
no. 170/1984, the ItCC has stated that every judge must apply the EU law with 
direct effect and not apply the national law in conflict. In no. 269/2017, the ItCC 
affirmed that when a violation of the EU Charter of fundamental rights is 
claimed, the judge must refer an order to the Court. The consequences of the 
judgement are not completely clear because the new doctrine was affirmed in an 
obiter dictum. Nevertheless, if the new doctrine is confirmed by the ItCC and 
followed by ordinary courts, the review of legislation under the grounds of 
fundamental rights will fall entirely within the centralised jurisdiction of the ItCC 
as an arbiter of human rights’ violations. In fact, considering the mutual 
influences of both systems, the ItCC would better manage the interpretation of 
both ECHR and EU rights compared with constitutional rights. Nevertheless, 
differences remain, the ECHR system aiming at fixing a minimum protection 
standard under the subsidiarity principle, and the EU Charter being part of an 
order based on primacy and relevant only within the scope of EU law. Moreover, 
it is well-established in ItCC case law that ECHR norms must respect all 
constitutional provisions, while the EU law and the Charter may disregard 
constitutional norms, finding their limits in the constitutional supreme principles 
(the so-called ‘counter-limits’). 
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in a dialogue, safeguarding their jurisdictional role and their 
mission as a supreme interpreter of the respective grundnorm8. In 
the latter sections of this study, we discuss the rationale 
underpinning the ItCC’s silent cooperation with the ECtHR. 
 
 
3. ItCC case law after 2007: general trends 
The Italian Constitutional Law no. 3 of 2001 introduced a 
specific reference to international obligations in Art. 117, par. 1, It. 
Const. After six years, in two landmark judgements, no. 348 and 
349/2007, or the so-called ItCC ‘twin’ judgements, the ItCC relied 
on Art. 117, par. 1, to assign a new supra-legislative status to the 
ECHR. In decision no. 348/2007, the ItCC recognised the ECtHR’s 
prominent role as an interpreter of the Convention; however, it had 
already affirmed that the ECtHR’s precedents were not strictly 
binding for constitutional adjudication, given the needs for a ‘fair 
balance’ between respect for international obligations and the 
protection of constitutional rights and interests9. The principles 
displayed in the twin judgements, in some way, have been 
reshaped by the following constitutional jurisprudence10, and the 
ItCC began using interpretative tools to justify the margin of 
discretion while implementing the ECHR11. 
                                                 
8 Sarmiento, cit. at 4, considers silent judgements a useful devise to develop 
cooperation, but cautions that in a Europe of 27 states (at the time), they can allow 
judicial chaos, threaten coherence, and ignore the systemic consequences of 
decisions. Moreover, national courts could interpret silence to set aside EU law 
and reaffirm their national identities, giving place to ‘an unashamed 
maladministration of EU law’ in a manner that is far from mutual understanding 
and awareness. To avoid this risk, Sarmiento suggests revisiting the CILFIT 
criteria to balance the judicial national claim of authority and correct application 
of EU law. 
9 See point 4.7. 
10 Dealing with the parameters for judicial review of legislation, since decision 
no. 311/2009, the ItCC admitted that several rights guaranteed under the 
ECHR—i.e. the right to life under Article 2 ECHR and prohibition of torture 
under Article 3 ECHR—embody international customary law so that they can be 
directly applied by judges under Article 10, par. 1, It. Const. 
11 The ItCC’s former Judge F. Gallo (Rapporti fra Corte costituzionale e Corte EDU, 
Bruxelles, 24 May 2012, at 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/relazioni_internazionali/RI_BRUXELLES
_2012_GALLO.pdf, accessed May 8, 2018) enumerates four main differences 
between the ItCC and ECtHR methods, reasoning and judgements: relevance of 
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In decision no. 317/2009, the ItCC clarified the criterion of 
‘the greatest expansion of fundamental rights’, that is, a comparison 
between the conventional and constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights must be conducted to obtain the greatest 
expansion of guarantees. The concept of the greatest expansion 
includes the requirement to weigh individual rights with other 
constitutional interests that may be affected by the expansion of 
individual protection. Thus, the impact of individual ECHR rules 
on Italian law must result in an increase in protection for the entire 
system of fundamental rights12. Consequently, first, the criterion of the 
greatest expansion of fundamental rights does not call upon the 
formal rank of norms (i.e. constitutional norms and supra-
legislative norms as the ECHR), but the material degree of 
protection. Second, the ItCC itself strikes a fair balance between the 
rights and general interests in question13. 
In the following case law, the ItCC has presented various 
arguments to declare where a fair balance lies between rights and 
other constitutional interests. On the one hand, the ItCC 
occasionally refers to the ECtHR margin of appreciation doctrine, 
according to which national authorities enjoy a certain level of 
discretion in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR. In fact, 
                                                 
concrete case; effects of decisions; use of comparative methods; and structure of 
decisions, including concurring and dissenting opinions. These differences 
render the ‘judicial transplant’ of the ECtHR case law to the ItCC case law far 
from mechanical given the need for coordination. The ItCC managed this 
coordination using different techniques: centralisation of the control of 
conventionality and recognition of the exclusive competence of the ECtHR while 
interpreting the Convention, thus maintaining a margin to balance conventional 
and constitutional rights for the ItCC itself. See O. Pollicino, The European Court 
of Human Rights and the Italian Constitutional Court: No ‘Groovy Kind of Love’, in K. 
Siegler (ed.), The UK and of European Court of Human Rights - A Strained 
Relationship? (2015). Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper no. 2668688 (at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2668688) surveyed three techniques applied by ItCC to 
increase its margin of discretion: the compliance with ECtHR case law ‘essence 
(or the substance)’, instead of the full judgements, quoting ItCC no. 317/2009; the 
distinguishing technique, quoting ItCC no. 236/2011; and the use of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine as a rhetorical tool to justify a self-made balance. In the 
text, we reference the same techniques in a partially different order. 
12 Judgement no. 317/2009, point 7. 
13 As A. Ruggeri, Appunti per uno studio delle più salienti vicende della giustizia 
costituzionale in Italia, Nomos 1 (2017), 1-15, 5, pointed out, the criterion is always 
of benefit to the Constitution and not to the ECHR norms. 
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since its early decisions, the ECtHR has stated that the Convention 
should leave the task of securing the rights and liberties it enshrines 
to each contracting state. Therefore, the ItCC uses the margin of 
discretion that the ECHR system, in principle, allows to shape its 
own fair balance between rights and general interest14. 
On the other hand, the ItCC resolves potential conflicts 
between constitutional and conventional norms using the 
distinguishing technique15. The same strategy is applied by the 
Supreme Court of Cassation. The ItCC often asks ordinary courts to 
distinguish their cases from the relevant precedents of Strasbourg. 
Legal scholars recognise that the technique of distinguishing is 
admissible because ECtHR has jurisdiction over the case facts. This 
technique also increases the dialogue between ECtHR and Italian 
courts, thus questioning if and in which circumstances a situation 
could entail a violation of the Convention. However, a superficial 
application of the technique could jeopardise the respect for 
Strasbourg precedents, threatening the principles of legal certainty, 
equal treatment and respect for legitimate expectations16. 
Moreover, the ItCC has reshaped the binding force of ECtHR 
precedents. In a more recent and highly controversial judgement, 
no. 49/2015, the ItCC ruled a question inadmissible because the 
principles laid down by the ECtHR in a single judgement against 
Italy were not sufficiently clear, well-established and deeply rooted 
in the ECtHR case law to become mandatory in Italian courts. In 
this way, the ItCC seems to leave behind strict obedience regarding 
                                                 
14See, for example, ItCC no. 1/2011 of 5 January 2011, for retrospective laws. 
15 For example, ItCC no. 236/2011 concerning the principle of nulla poena sine lege. 
The decision has been intended as a reply to ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 17 
September 2009, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2), application no. 10249/03. The ItCC stated 
that the Strasbourg precedent ‘although aimed at establishing a general principle 
[…], remains nonetheless linked to the concreteness of the case in which it was 
ruled: the fact that the European Court is called to assess upon a material case 
and, most of all, the specificity of the single case issued, are factors to be carefully 
weighed and taken into account by the Constitutional Court, when applying the 
principles ascertained by the Strasbourg Court at the domestic level, in order to 
review the constitutionality of one norm allegedly at odds with that principles’. 
16 A. Guazzarotti, Strasbourg Jurisprudence as an Input for ‘Cultural Evolution’ in 
Italian Judicial Practise, in G. Repetto (ed.), The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR 
in Domestic and European Law. An Italian Perspective, cit. at 2, 55-68, 63. 
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the ECtHR interpretation and makes a selection of relevant 
precedents itself17. 
As a result of the reshaping by the ItCC, today, the ECHR 
status in Italian legal order can be summarised as follows: (a) the 
ECHR has a supra-legislative rank (b) all judges must implement 
conventional rights following the ECtHR case law; moreover, all 
judges must interpret domestic law, as much as possible, in 
conformity with the ECtHR living interpretation; when a consistent 
interpretation is not possible, courts must make a referral to the 
ItCC to evaluate the consistency in the internal norm with the 
ECHR (c) the judicial review of legislation on the ground on 
conventionality falls within the exclusive competence of the ItCC 
and (d) the ItCC recognises a prominent role in ECtHR 
interpretation, but eventually, the ItCC must strike a fair balance 
between all rights and general interests at stake. 
 
 
4. Survey on the application of Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const.  
In the above paragraph, we described some general trends 
in the ItCC case law dealing with ECHR. The ItCC case law can be 
categorised using different methods. We opted for a classification 
based on a formal criterion: the parameters to rule the question of 
unconstitutionality, and particularly, the application of Art. 117, 
par. 1, It. Const. As mentioned before, since the twin judgements of 
2007, Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. has assumed significance in the 
ECHR incorporation into the Italian legal order as an intermediate 
norm between law and the Constitution. The assumption is that 
                                                 
17 ItCC judgement no. 49/2015 of 16 March 2015, concerning the ECtHR Varvara 
v. Italy case of 29 October 2013, on the imposition of a confiscation order despite 
the termination of criminal proceedings following an unlawful land 
development in breach of Article 7 ECHR and Article 1, Prot. 1. The case was 
strongly criticised by legal scholars because the ItCC differentiated between 
ECtHR judgements on the basis of procedural and substantive criteria (e.g. 
simple Chamber or Grand Chamber decision, ‘novelty’ of the principle applied 
by the ECtHR, and the existence of concurring or dissenting opinions), while ex 
Article 46 ECHR all judgements are binding for the respondent state. In fact, 
judgement no. 49/2015 seems to be isolated. In subsequent decisions, the ItCC 
analysed the coherence of the ECtHR case law to identify the exact meaning of 
the conventional norm (chose interpretée) and not undermine the binding force of 
judgements against Italy (chose jugée); see, for example, no. 184/2015, no. 36/2016 
and no. 200/2016. 
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adjudication on the ground of Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. might highlight 
an alleged violation of the ECHR18. However, an in-depth analysis of 
the legal reasoning demonstrates that the sole reference to Art. 117, 
par. 1, It. Const. is not meaningful to test compliance with the 
ECtHR case law. Therefore, we expanded the analysis to other 
referral orders in which a violation of Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is 
claimed, but the provision is not applied by the ItCC. The analysis 
resulted in three categories: 
a. Concordant cases: cases in which Art. 117, par. 
1, It. Const. is applied alone or together with another 
substantive constitutional parameter to provide an 
interpretation of constitutional rights in line with the ECtHR 
case law. 
b. Discordant cases: cases in which Art. 117, par. 
1, It. Const. is also applied; however, it is used to underline 
the constitutional subordination of the ECHR to the 
Constitution and the need for a new balance between 
conventional rights and other constitutional interests. 
c. Silent cases: cases in which Art. 117, par. 1, It. 
Const. remains silent, the unconventionality being held on 
the sole grounds of substantive constitutional norms, for 
example Art. 2 or Art. 3 It. Const. 
The first and second sets of cases share an explicit 
application of Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const., while the third set 
comprises cases in which Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is not formally 
considered, which are the so-called ‘silent cases’. Cases in the first 
category have the feature of harmony in common between 
constitutional and conventional norms; that is, the ItCC and ECtHR 
rulings are consistent. The consistency occasionally involves a 
broad application of ECHR principles to circumstances that the 
ECtHR is yet to consider. Thus, we call them ‘concordant cases’19. 
                                                 
18 It must be clarified that the selection of parameters for constitutional 
adjudication depends on the referral order. The ItCC may enlarge the parameter, 
but the grounds on which the issue of constitutionality arises are identified by 
the referring judge. See note 3. 
19 See, for example, the numerous ItCC judgements quashing Italian legislation 
on criminal proceedings which did not provide for a public hearing under Article 
6, par. 1, ECHR (right to a fair trial): ItCC no. 93/2010 of 12 March 2010; no. 
135/2014 of 21 May 2014; no. 97/2015 of 5 June 2016; no. 109/2015 of 16 June 
2015, all following ECtHR, Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy, 13 November 2007, no. 
399/02; Perre and others v. Italy, 8 July 2008, no. 1905/05; Leone v. Italy, 2 February 
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By contrast, cases in the second category include a deviation 
from the ECtHR statements20. In those cases, Art. 117, par. 1, It. 
Const. is used to mark the subordination of the ECHR norms to the 
Constitution. Thus, they are called ‘discordant cases’. From a generic 
viewpoint, discordant cases are fewer than concordant ones. 
Furthermore, in both sets of cases the ItCC performs a strong 
analysis of ECtHR precedents, explaining their arguments and 
outcomes. The next paragraph explores the third category, silent 
cases. 
First, for a comprehensive view, it is useful to focus on a 
well-known ‘discordant case’ in which the control of 
conventionality has been autonomously ruled under Art. 117, par. 
1, It. Const. We use the so-called ‘Maggio case’, ItCC judgement no. 
264/2012, which followed ECtHR, Maggio and others v. Italy 
judgement of 31 May 201121. A law of authentic interpretation had 
reset the calculation system for the pensions of Italian workers 
employed in Switzerland, which caused their pensions to be lower 
than that estimated before. Under Art. 1 Prot. 1 ECHR, the ECtHR 
stated that the control of public expenses and determination of 
                                                 
2010, no. 30506/07; Bongiorno and others v. Italy, 2 February 2010, no. 4514/07; 
Paleari v. Italy, 26 July 2011, no. 55772/08; Capitani and Campanella v. Italy, 17 May 
2011, no. 24920/07; Pozzi v. Italy, 26 July 2011, no. 55743/08, on public hearing in 
proceedings concerning the application of preventive measures; and Lorenzetti v. 
Italy, on public hearing with the Court of Appeal for unfair detention. 
Impressively, the ItCC used the same words as those of the ECtHR to describe 
the rationale underpinning public hearings and considered the identical 
requirements, that is, the degree of technicality of the proceedings and the entity 
of rights at stake. In conclusion, in the words of ItCC, the conventional norm does 
not contradict the protection granted by the Constitution but is in harmony with 
it (literally, ‘sostanziale assonanza’). See also ItCC no. 184/2015 of 23 July 2015 
on the length of proceedings; no. 196/2010 of 4 June 2010 on administrative 
sanctions and the prohibition of retrospective law; and no. 210/2013 of 18 July 
2013 on the lex mitior principle consistent with the Scoppola case of 2009. Even in 
the concordant cases, an effort is made by the ItCC to shape conventional norms 
as more general principles shared by the Constitution and other international 
human rights treaties. For example, public hearing is defined as a principle 
rooted in all democratic systems. 
20 See ItCC no. 264/2012 on a retrospective law concerning the calculation of 
pensions and no. 49/2015, quoted above, on confiscation measures following 
unlawful land development. 
21 See ItCC no. 264/2012 of 28 November 2012. However, instead of the issue of 
retrospective laws, ItCC no. 191/2014 of 20 May 2014 is an example of a 
concordant case. 
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pensions to secure social justice are legitimate aims and the margin 
of appreciation enjoyed by national authorities in implementing 
socioeconomic policies is broad. Nevertheless, the ECtHR held that 
there had been a violation of Art. 6, par. 1, ECHR because the Italian 
law had retrospectively set the pension level and settled, once and 
for all, the terms of disputes pending before the ordinary courts to 
which the state was party. Following the ECtHR Maggio judgement, 
the Court of Cassation made a referral order to the ItCC, 
challenging Italian legislation on the ground of Art. 117 par. 1, It. 
Const., that is, Art. 6, par. 1, ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR in 
Maggio. The ItCC ruled that the applicants had no legitimate 
expectations of a pension in line with the previous calculation 
system since the contested provisions were an expression of the 
principles of equality and solidarity prevailing within the balancing 
test of rights and interests at stake. The ItCC employed rhetorical 
tools to identify a margin of discretion in line with the ECtHR 
precedent, that is, the ‘great expansion of fundamental rights’ 
criterion and the previously mentioned margin of appreciation 
doctrine. 
However, more deeply, the ItCC explicitly differentiated its 
role from that of the ECtHR. It stated that the protection of 
fundamental rights must be systemic, not fragmented: ‘the ECHR 
norm, while entering into the legal order through the first 
paragraph of Art. 117 Const. as an intermediate norm, is subject to 
a fair balance settled with the interpretative tools ordinarily used 
by this Court’22. In another part of the judgement, the ItCC affirmed 
that while the ECtHR is charged with the protection of single rights 
in a fragmented manner, it is for the ItCC to consider rights and 
                                                 
22 ItCC, no. 264/2012: ‘At the end, if, as the Court said (judgements no. 236, no. 
113 and no. 1 of 2011, no. 93 of 2010, no. 311 and no. 239 of 2009, no. 39 of 2008, 
no. 349 and 348 of 2007), the Constitutional Court cannot substitute its own 
interpretation of a ECHR norm to the one given by the ECtHR applying that 
norm to the single case, crossing the boundaries of its competences in violation 
of a binding obligation taken by the Italian State through the signature and 
ratification, without reservation, of the Convention, anyway the Court must 
consider if and how the application of the Convention by the ECtHR enters into 
the Italian constitutional legal order. The ECHR norm, while entering into the 
legal order through the first paragraph of Article 117 Const. as an intermediate 
norm, is subject to a fair balance settled with the interpretative tools ordinarily 
used by this Court… This setting is not aimed at affirming the primacy of national 
order, but at integrating the protection of rights’ (point 4.2.). 
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general interests as a whole in a systemic and not isolated 
perspective. In this way, the ItCC justified a balance that differed 
from the one struck by the ECtHR, ruling that the claim of 
unconstitutionality was unfounded. At same time, the ItCC aimed 
at preventing a clear clash with the ECtHR, affirming that ‘This 
setting [the fair balance between ECtHR rights and other 
constitutional general interests] is not aimed at affirming the 
primacy of national order, but at integrating the protection of 
rights’. Despite these prudent words, a conflict erupted. Following 
ItCC judgement no. 264/2012, the ECtHR ruled on similar Italian 
cases, holding again a violation of Art. 6, par. 1, ECHR and, for the 
first time, a violation of Art. 1 Prot. 1 ECHR given the level of 
reduction in pensions to less than two-third23. 
 
 
5. Silent cases 
For the purpose of this study, the ItCC decisions have been 
considered examples of silent cases when the cases adjudicated at 
supranational and national level are similar and the ‘similarity’ 
between cases concerns their underlying facts; the referral order to 
the ItCC quotes the ECtHR case law; and the ItCC adjudicates the 
case in accordance with the ECtHR, although avoiding any 
reference to Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. 
                                                 
23 See ECtHR, Stefanetti and others v. Italy, 15 April 2014, no. 21838/10 and other 
7, for a declaration of a violation of both Article 6, par. 1, and Article 1 Prot. 1; 
Biraghi and others v. Italy, 24 June 2014, no. 3429/09 and other 21, and Cataldo and 
others v. Italy, 24 June 2014, no. 54425/08 and other 5, for a claim on the violation 
of the sole Article 6, par. 1. In the Biraghi and Cataldo judgements, each applicant 
was awarded a sum of €6.000–47.500, depending on the circumstances of the case, 
and a non-pecuniary damage of €10.000. The ECtHR stated that ‘Contrary to the 
case-law of the Italian Constitutional Court, there existed no compelling general 
interest reasons justifying a retrospective application of the Law no. 296/2006, 
which was not an authentic interpretation of the original law and was therefore 
unforeseeable’ (§65 Stefanetti judgement). In Stefanetti, the ECtHR considered that 
the question of compensation for pecuniary damage was not ready for a decision. 
In the following judgement of 1 June 2017, Italy was condemned to pay a total 
amount of €874.962 and €5.000 conjointement to applicants, plus legal interests. 
The panel of the Grand Chamber rejected the request of Italian Government to 
refer the decision. Following Stefanetti, ItCC no. 166 of 2017 confirmed the 
solution adopted in decision no. 264/2012 and ruled the question non-
admissible, but recommended the intervention of the legislative. 
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We consider three pairs of cases. The first couple deals with 
knowledge of personal information, the second with the 
transmission of surnames and the third with the use of embryos for 
scientific research. The three pairs partially differ from each other. 
They have all been decided on the grounds of substantive 
constitutional parameters. However, in the ‘one’s origin case’ and 
‘the surname case’, the referring judge claimed a violation of both 
substantive constitutional rights and the ECHR—the latter through 
Art. 117, par. 1. Thus, the ItCC was able to choose the parameter 
between the ones identified by the referring judge. In contrast, in 
‘the embryos case’, the referral order did not account for the ECHR. 
The referring tribunal set the issue on the sole ground of substantive 
constitutional rights. The ItCC freely chose to broaden the 
parameter to the ECtHR case law24. The third couple could signify 
deeper cooperation between courts, given that the ECHR was not 
even invoked by the referral order. 
In detail, the first couple addressed the confidentiality of 
information concerning a child’s origins. We discuss the ECtHR 
judgement Godelli v. Italy of 25 September 201225 and ItCC 
judgement no. 278 of 18 November 2013. Italian law guaranteed the 
right to keep a child’s origin a secret when the mother asked for 
anonymity at the time of birth; the mother had the absolute right to 
have her wish respected. In the Godelli case, an Italian woman, who 
was abandoned at birth by her mother, made attempts to source the 
details of her origin but her request was denied. Under the ECtHR 
case law, Art. 8 ECHR protects the right to identity and personal 
development, which involves establishing the truth about one’s 
origins. The Godelli case called into question the mother’s interest in 
preserving her anonymity, the child’s interest in learning about her 
origins, and the general interest of preventing illegal abortions and 
giving birth in appropriate medical conditions. Relying on a 
precedent related to France, more specifically, the Odièvre case, the 
ECtHR held that the Italian system failed to strike a fair balance 
between the competing interests because total and definitive 
preference was given to the sole wish of the birth mother. In 
contrast with the French law, the Italian law did not provide a 
                                                 
24 This is clearly stated by the ItCC, affirming that the conventional parameters 
had not been involved in the pending judgement; see ItCC no. 84/2016 of 22 
March 2016, point 10. 
25 ECtHR, Godelli c. Italy, 25 September 2012, no. 33783/09. 
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mechanism to disclose the mother’s identity with her consent. 
Therefore, the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Art. 8 
ECHR. 
Following the Godelli case, an Italian ordinary court made a 
referral order to the ItCC in a similar case concerning the desire of 
an adopted woman to know her mother’s identity. The referring 
judge challenged the unconstitutionality of the Italian law on the 
grounds of certain constitutional norms: Art. 2 It. Const., in which 
the right to personal identity is incorporated; Art. 3 It. Const. on the 
principle of equality; Art. 32 It. Const. on the right to health because 
the denial of parental identity would prevent the applicant from 
possible screenings for genetic diseases; and Art. 117, par. 1, It. 
Const. The ItCC overruled its precedent no. 425 of 2005 (in the 
Court’s words, a ‘fully analogous case’ in which the question of 
unconstitutionality was judged as clearly unfounded) and quashed 
the Italian legislation. It is surprising that ItCC judgement no. 278 
of 2013 broadly refers to the ECtHR case Godelli, but the declaration 
of unconstitutionality has been made on the sole grounds of Artt. 2 
and 3 It. Const.26. 
The second pair of cases concerns equality between spouses 
regarding the transmission of surname to their children: ECtHR 
judgement of 7 July 2014, Fazzo and Cusan v. Italy, and ItCC 
judgement no. 286 of 21 December 2016. The Italian legal order 
mandated a rule by which legitimate children were given their 
father’s surname at birth. Despite an agreement between the 
spouses, the mother was unable to give her family name to the 
baby. The father’s surname rule was implicit from a number of 
articles in the Italian Civil Code considered together. All domestic 
remedies were exhausted and the married couple applied to 
ECtHR, alleging a violation of Art. 8 ECHR, alone or taken together 
with Art. 14 ECHR on the prohibition of discrimination and Art. 5 
Prot. 7 ECHR concerning equality between spouses. In line with its 
previous case law, the ECtHR held that the decision to name a child 
according to the transmission of the father’s surname entailed 
discrimination on the ground of parents’ sex because the father’s 
                                                 
26 The wish for coordination with the ECtHR and, at the same time, autonomous 
evaluation and assessment of the constitutional rights in question in the Godelli 
case is discussed in the ‘University of Macerata - Alberico Gentili Lessons’ by 
ItCC Judge G. Amato, Corte costituzionale e Corti europee. Fra diversità nazionali e 
visione commune (2015), 61-89. 
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name rule allowed for no exceptions, irrespective of the spouses’ 
alternative joint wish27. It followed that there had been a violation 
of the principle of non-discrimination under Art. 14 taken together 
with the right to respect private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR. 
Subsequent to the ECtHR judgement, Fazzo and Cusan, the 
ItCC ruled on a referral order in a similar case. The referral order 
was an antecedent to the Fazzo and Cusan judgement and relied on 
Italian Constitution’s norms: Art. 2 It. Const. protecting personal 
identity; Art. 3 and Art. 29, par. 2, It. Const. on equality and equal 
dignity of the spouses between them and in relation to their 
children; and Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. mentioning the consistent 
ECtHR case law previous to the Fazzo and Cusan case. The ItCC 
fixed the flaw in the national legal system and as a result, child can 
be entered in the register of births with both the father’s and the 
mother’s surnames. The outcome is broadly similar to that of the 
ECtHR28; however, the judgement was formally based on national 
constitutional substantive norms, and particularly, the right to the 
child’s personal identity and principle of equality. While the 
violation of Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. was not considered, a clear 
reference to the Fazzo and Cusan statements was made to define the 
scope of the constitutional right to personal identity. 
The third pair of cases deals with embryo donation for 
scientific research stemming from in vitro fertilisation. For the first 
time, in the Parrillo case, the ECtHR was asked to rule on the 
question whether Art. 8 ECHR could encompass the right to donate 
embryos placed in cryopreservation for scientific research. In a long 
and complex decision of 27 August 201529, the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber held that Art. 8 was applicable because the exercise of a 
conscious choice on the fate of embryos concerns an intimate aspect 
of personal life and is related to the right to self-determination. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR held, by sixteen votes to one, that there 
had been no violation of the provision as there was no European 
consensus on the subject, with some states permitting human 
                                                 
27 See ECtHR, Burghartz v. Switzerland, 22 February 1994, no. 16213/90; Ünal Tekeli 
v. Turkey, 16 November 2004, no. 29865/96; and Losonci Rose and Rose v. 
Switzerland, 9 November 2010, no. 664/06. 
28 The ECtHR sanctioned the inability of parents to have their child enter the 
register of births under the mother’s surname. The ItCC, on the other hand, stated 
that the child should have been registered also with the mother’s surname. 
29ECtHR, GC, Parrillo v. Italy, 7 August 2015, no. 46470/11. 
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embryonic cell lines, others expressly prohibiting it and some 
others permitting research only under strict conditions. In addition, 
the donation of embryos raised delicate moral and ethical 
questions. For these reasons, the Italian law on assisted 
reproduction did not overstep the wide margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by national authorities in the matter. In the meanwhile, the 
ItCC was referred with an order concerning an analogous case. The 
aim of cooperation is evident considering that the referral order 
challenged the Italian law on the grounds of the sole substantive 
constitutional parameters and did not refer to Art. 117, par. 1, It. 
Const.30. However, the ItCC adjourned the case and postponed the 
date of the public hearing in anticipation for the ECtHR judgement. 
Even if Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. was not mentioned, the ItCC 
broadly relied on the ECtHR Parrillo case to argue that a general 
consensus on the issue did not exist. Finally, the ItCC held the 
question inadmissible because it is for the legislative to strike a fair 
balance between the fundamental values in question. 
In conclusion, in the selected pairs of cases the ECHR rights 
and their interpretation were considered to define the substance of 
constitutional rights, under which the national law is interpreted 
and if ever quashed. However, they are not separately managed to 
sanction that law under Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, a further 
categorisation can be made. In the first two cases, following Godelli 
and Fazzo and Cusan, the ItCC could choose between different 
parameters: the substantive constitutional norms and procedural 
norm of Art. 117, par. 1; in the last case, concerning Parrillo, the 
referring judge did not mention Art. 117, par. 1. This means that in 
the first two cases, the ItCC gave logical priority to substantive 
constitutional norms, while in the third case, the reference to ECtHR 
case law was made ex officio. 
In the final part of the study, we will discuss the rationale 
underlying such legal reasoning. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 ItCC no. 84/2016 of 22 March 2016. The order claimed for unconstitutionality 
on the grounds of Artt. 2, 3, 9, 13, 31, 32, 33, par. 1, It. Const. 
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6. Comparative perspective: silent cases in the French 
experience 
To better understand ItCC trends, a comparative perspective 
could be useful. This perspective is examined in limited terms, with 
only some preliminary remarks, while the issue needs a more 
comprehensive study. 
The French and Italian models of judicial review of 
legislation entail significant variations in the ECHR 
implementation. First, France is a monistic system, while Italy is a 
dualistic one. In detail, following Art. 55 Fr. Const., international 
treaties have a formal supra-legislative rank in the hierarchy of 
norms31. However, as Keller and Stone have demonstrated, there is 
no causal linkage between ex ante monism and dualism and the 
reception of ECHR. The way the ECHR is incorporated is an 
outcome of the reception process which in turn, will impact 
reception ex post32. Thus, a comparison between monistic and 
dualistic systems can be performed. 
Second, even if in both countries, constitutional adjudication 
is centralised under a Constitutional Tribunal, the control of 
conventionality is managed differently. Since the well-known 
decision of 1975, IVG, the French Constitutional Council (FrCC) has 
stated that international treaties are not part of the bloc de 
constitutionnalité and the conventionality control falls entirely and 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of common courts33. The reasons 
                                                 
31 Article 55 Fr. Const.: ‘Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, 
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each 
agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party’. France signed the 
ECHR on 4 November 1950, but ratified it only on 3 May 1974; the right to 
individual petition was recognised only on 2 October 1981. 
32 H. Keller, A. Stone Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of ECHR on 
National Legal Systems (2009), 685-686. The point accepted that some states, 
including Italy, found it difficult to precisely confer a supra-legislative rank on 
the ECHR because of their dualistic natures, although there is a great deal of 
variation even in this small group. Dualistic countries tend to incorporate 
through a statute, whereas monist states do so through judicial decisions. A 
monistic constitutional structure could provide the judiciary with more leeway 
in the reception process. In dualistic countries, where a powerful Constitutional 
or Supreme Court defends national human rights, the authors observed reticence 
among judges to base their rulings on the ECHR as an independent source of 
rights. 
33 FrCC no. 74/54 DC of 15 January 1975, Loi relative à l'interruption volontaire de 
la grossesse. 
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that have led to this statement vary. On the one hand, under the 
French a priori model of judicial review of legislation, the non-
conformity of the law with the Constitution has a permanent 
character and the violation of the Constitution prevents the law’s 
entry into force. By contrast, the FrCC held that a law inconsistent 
with an international treaty should not be applied in the case; 
however, it does not need to be quashed or disappear from the legal 
system. Therefore, if there are changes in the execution conditions 
for the Treaty, the law can produce the effects again. Thus, while 
the control of conventionality is relative and temporary, that of 
constitutionality is absolute and definitive. On the other hand, 
under Art. 55 Fr. Const., the binding force of treaties is subject to 
their application by the other parties. Therefore, the FrCC 
considered the application of international norms to be contingent 
on reciprocity, while the application of constitutional norms is not. 
This argument has been critically discussed by scholars for a long 
time given that the condition of reciprocity does not fit international 
human rights treaties. By contrast, human rights treaties are sources 
of a general and objective obligation to protect the human rights of 
all people within the jurisdiction of the member state, irrespective 
of the human rights standards ensured by other states. To this 
effect, many scholars have advocated the overruling of the IVG 
principles and centralisation of the control of conventionality 
because laws adopted in violation of an international treaty are 
contrary to Art. 55 Fr. Const.34. 
Although there are differences between the French and 
Italian control of conventionality, silent cases also exist in the FrCC 
case law. Indeed, before the entry into force of the a posteriori 
judicial review of legislation in 2008, or the so-called ‘question 
prioritaire de constitutionnalité/QPC reform’, the FrCC found a way 
to implicitly verify the conventionality of laws, that is, review the 
legislation under the ECHR and ECtHR case law without mentioning 
them. 
On the one hand, the FrCC considered that a law on asylum 
was not contrary to the Constitution provided ‘in the silence of the 
questioned law’, the law is interpreted in compliance with an 
                                                 
34 See D. Rousseau, Droit du contentieux constitutionnel (2013), 111, quoting, for a 
critical approach on IVG principles, J. Rivero, Actualité juridique. Droit 
administrative (1975), 134; F. Luchaire, ivi, 137. 
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international convention on refugees ratified by France. Such legal 
reasoning is called the ‘neutralisation technique’. Art. 55 Fr. Const. 
is not a formal component of the constitutional adjudication 
reasoning, but the respect for international obligations is imposed 
through a binding interpretation of the law35. On the other hand, 
the FrCC interpreted the constitutional right of defence using the 
same words of the ECtHR but without mentioning it36. 
During the discussion concerning the introduction of the a 
posteriori judicial review of legislation, scholars suggested the 
centralisation of conventionality control together with the ex post 
control of constitutionality, although this suggestion was not 
implemented. Following the QPC reform, in 2010, the FrCC held 
again that the control of conventionality, as well as compliance with 
the EU law, falls entirely under the jurisdiction of ordinary and 
administrative courts37. However, here as well, the scholars remark 
that the interpretation of constitutional rights often incorporates 
ECtHR interpretation38. 
There are two preliminary conclusions. First, in both the 
French and Italian experience, some form of silent cooperation is 
performed, irrespective of the monistic or dualistic relationship 
between national and international order. In both systems, the 
constitutional judge maintains a level of compliance with the 
ECHR. However, the silent cases of the FrCC differ from those 
concerning the Italian experience because the FrCC generally tends 
to not mention the ECHR, while the ItCC broadly refers to the 
ECHR and ECtHR case law. In the Italian experience, the reference 
to ECtHR has become explicit and the silence concerns the 
alternative of adjudication (even) on basis of Art. 117, par. 1, or the 
sole grounds of substantive constitutional norms. 
                                                 
35 See FrCC no. 86/216 DC of 3 September 1986, Revue française de droit 
administrative (1987), 120, note of B. Genevois; the same technique is applied in 
FrCC no. 92/307 DC of 25 February 1992, ivi, 1992, note of B. Genevois. 
36 See, for example, FrCC 89/260 DC of 28 July 1989. The FrCC directly applied 
the ECHR in electoral disputes, in which it rules as an ordinary judge (see FrCC 
21 October 1988, applying Article 3 Prot. 1 ECHR; FrCC 8 November 1988, on the 
holding of a public hearing under Article 6 ECHR, quoted by D. Rousseau, cit. at 
34). 
37 FrCC 2010/605 DC of 12 May 2010. 
38 B. Mathieu, Les décisions du Conseil Constitutionnel et de la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme: Coexistence, Autorité, Conflits, Régulation, 32 Nouveau Cahier du 
Conseil Constitutionnel (2011), 11. 
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 Second, the rationale of implicit cooperation depends on the 
features of each system. In France, the confirmation of the IVG 
principles is an expression of concern to maintain a well-established 
relationship with the national Supreme Courts, Court of Cassation 
and Council of State more than the desire to set a relationship with 
the ECtHR itself. In Italy, the justification of silent cooperation may 
differ. Nevertheless, in both systems constitutional law scholars 
have suggested an explicit reference to ECHR for similar reasons, 
that is, to counteract marginalisation and self-exclusion of the 
constitutional judge from the ‘network’ of European Courts to 
avoid the risk of external imposition of rights that do not fit local 
sociocultural traditions and ensure its active contribution to the 
‘shaping’ of human rights39. 
 
 
7. Search for the rationale behind Italian silent cases 
We now refer to the ItCC behaviour concerning ECHR. From 
our perspective, the ItCC case law concerning ECHR involves both 
explicit cases, in which Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is formally applied 
and silent cases, in which Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is not 
considered. Both explicit and silent cases make a clear reference to 
ECtHR case law. However, in silent cases, the ItCC ruled on internal 
laws potentially inconsistent with the ECtHR case law on the 
grounds of substantive constitutional norms, such as the right to 
personal identity or principle of equality. The outcome is similar to 
that ruled by the ECtHR, but it lacks a strict and formal reference to 
Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. Therefore, an explicit violation on the 
ground of the ECHR is not autonomously mentioned. This section 
aims to analyse the rationale underpinning this manner of 
reasoning. 
                                                 
39 For the period before the QPC reform, see G. Carcassone and B. Genevois, Faut-
il maintenir la jurisprudence issue de la décision 74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975 ?, Les 
Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel 7 (1999), 93-100 and 101-108. As for condition 
after the QPC implementation, particularly about the potential FrCC risk of 
losing control on constitutional human rights adjudication, see D. Rousseau, cit. 
at 34, 112-113. See Contra, B. Mathieu, cit. at 38, 13 of the draft given that the 
ECtHR would become a Supreme Court in a system that is not federal. In the 
author’s opinion, the FrCC should continue interpreting constitutional rights in 
compliance with the ECHR without overruling the IVG principles but by making 
clear reference to ECtHR jurisprudence. 
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Indeed, a silent cooperation between the ItCC and ECtHR 
already existed before the landmark decisions of 2007, when the 
ECHR did not have a formal supra-legislative rank yet. The 
cooperation included referring to the ECHR to confirm and reaffirm 
the interpretation of constitutional rights40. This form of silent 
cooperation persists after 2007. However, the meaning of silence 
somehow changed thereafter. In fact, since 2007, the position of the 
ECHR in national legal order, as well as the tasks of ordinary judges 
and the ItCC performing the control of conventionality, has been 
clearly defined. 
In general, it appears that the ItCC’s choice of parameter is 
flexible and unpredictable. The case law does not follow a guiding 
principle that clearly explains why the ItCC applies both 
substantive constitutional norms and Art. 117, par. 1; the sole Art. 
117; or the substantive constitutional parameter. In other words, no 
well-established and coherent logical priority is given to substantive 
constitutional violations instead of conventional violations. 
Having said this, the ‘substantive constitutional favour’ can 
be explained in different ways. On the one hand, the focus on a 
substantive constitutional parameter could depend on the involved 
rights as an expression of rooted sociocultural traditions. Since the 
topic at hand is sensitive and controversial issues, such family 
matters or medical procreation, relying on a substantive 
constitutional norm instead of a conventional parameter can 
increase public acceptance of the outcome. The priority given to 
substantive constitutional rights suggests that the solution from 
Strasbourg was already set out in the Constitution, that is, the 
Constitution is able to independently answer social questions and 
these answers must be accepted because they rely on and belong to 
the evolution of our legal, social and cultural tradition. 
                                                 
40 See M. Cartabia, Of Bridges and Walls: The ‘Italian Style’ of Constitutional 
Adjudication, this Review 1 (2016), 37-55, 50: ‘While, at the beginning of the 
European adventure, the Italian Court considered its supranational and foreign 
counterparts as aliens, a period of informal reciprocal influence then followed, 
during which the Italian Constitutional Court – while avoiding all formal 
reference to the case law of the two European Court – was actually well aware of 
the case law developed in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. ... However, long before 
opening up to direct dialogue with the European Courts [with the two 
judgements of 2007], the Italian Constitutional Court maintained an implicit and 
silent, although influential, attention to their decisions’. 
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On the other hand, such behaviour could aim at preserving 
the supremacy of national constitutions, regardless of the issues at 
stake, and reaffirming the prominent role of national constitutional 
courts. If so, there is room to suspect ‘patriotism’. In fact, priority 
might be given to constitutional rights as the only true source of 
fundamental rights. In this framework, the ItCC plays a central role, 
thus having the final say in constitutional human rights 
adjudication. If this is true, silent cases are underpinned by a claim 
of autonomy and could be perceived by scholars as a potential 
symptom of increasing irreconcilable diversities. 
Moreover, if the focus is placed on predictability and legal 
certainty as core values of judicial adjudication, it could be argued 
that the explicit analysis of ECtHR jurisprudence on the grounds of 
Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. would serve as clarity. This would further 
allow the comparison of constitutional rights as interpreted by the 
ItCC with conventional rights as understood by the ECtHR. By 
contrast, the incorporation of the ECtHR case law in substantive 
constitutional parameters could increase judicial discretion. In this 
way, slight divergences between constitutional and conventional 
case law could be easily hidden. These considerations suggest that 
the lack of reference to Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. could break 
cooperation between courts. 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, this conclusion does not fit the 
case law analysis. As seen before, the sole reference to Art. 117, par. 
1, It. Const. is insufficient to evaluate the level of compliance 
between jurisprudence. Thus, other considerations must be taken 
into account. 
In our silent cases, the ItCC and ECtHR case law are 
consistent. Despite the sole reference to substantive constitutional 
rights, the ItCC legal reasoning deeply analyses the ECtHR 
arguments and their outcome. In principle, and with certain 
nuances, the silent cases show a strong commitment to the ECtHR 
case law. In addition, from a substantive viewpoint, the reference 
to the sole constitutional parameter seems a way to stress that 
unconventionality results in unconstitutionality. Such reasoning is 
coherent with the ItCC general trends reported in the second 
section of this research. In judgement no. 317/2009, while holding 
that there must be a comparison between the ECHR and 
Constitution to obtain the greatest expansion of fundamental rights, 
the ItCC made the commitment to develop ‘the potential inherent in 
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the constitutional norms which concern the same rights’. Indeed, in the 
silent cases, the comparison between conventional and 
constitutional rights is performed within constitutional provisions. 
The ECHR, and ECtHR interpretation, does not interact with 
national law as a separate and autonomous parameter, which calls 
for an external comparison with constitutional norms, although it 
internally shapes the meaning of constitutional norms. Hence, the 
lack of reference to Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. cannot be seen as a 
sign of ‘patriotism’ per se. 
This conclusion is clear if we explore the execution of ECtHR 
judgements before the Committee of Ministers. Indeed, during the 
execution of the Godelli judgement, following the obligations under 
Art. 46 ECHR, the Italian Government referred to the ItCC 
judgement no. 278 of 2013 as a general measure to avoid similar 
violations41. It is noteworthy that even if the ItCC formally quashed 
the law under substantive constitutional norms, its judgement 
ensured compliance with the ECtHR and it was explicitly used by 
Italian authorities to prove compliance. 
In sum, silent cases underline substantive compliance with 
the ECtHR case law. Returning to the Sarmiento’s analysis, in our 
framework, silent cases are also a means of ‘complicity’. However, 
there is a key difference. ECJ’s laconic answers avoid conflicts, 
while in the ItCC case law on ECHR, when there is a clash between 
conventional and constitutional rights, there is no silence. And the 
ItCC speaks through Art. 117, par. 1. In fact, the ‘discordant cases’ 
clearly mention Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. In this sense, the 
previously quoted Maggio case is significant. In principle bound by 
the ECtHR Maggio judgement, the ItCC lent itself to a balancing 
exercise, considering that other opposing constitutional interests 
prevailed in the case’s circumstances. The foregoing considerations 
suggest the final remarks presented in the following section. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The ItCC case law following a previous ECtHR judgement 
shows that the choice of parameters for constitutional adjudication 
is flexible. The analysis of silent cases, in which an explicit reference 
                                                 
41 See the action report Dh-DD(2015)999, Committee of Ministers 1243 meeting, 
8-10 December 2015, Communication from Italy Concerning the Case of Godelli 
against Italy. 
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to Art. 117, par. 1, is lacking, demonstrates that their legal reasoning 
and outcome are consistent with those of the ECtHR case law. The 
incorporation of ECHR and ECtHR case law into the constitutional 
rights parameter means that ECHR norms are constitutional in 
substance. Despite the formal sub-constitutional rank of ECHR in 
the hierarchy of norms, in silent cases conventional norms are 
managed as constitutional ones. Thus, this type of reasoning 
maximises the degree of ECHR’s integration into national legal 
system. In other words, silence is a means to unity. 
Instead, ECHR’s formal rank emerges when the 
interpretation, that is, the fair balance, of the two courts is 
diverging. Therefore, Art. 117, par. 1, It. Const. is the procedural norm 
to stress the subordination of ECHR to the Constitution. Thus, the 
explicit reference to Art. 117, par. 1, parameter is a means to 
plurality. In other words, when the outcome is consistent with the 
ECtHR rulings, reference to Art. 117, par. 1, remains optional; 
however, when the constitutional balance and ECHR balance differ, 
Art. 117, par. 1, becomes necessary. If this is true, the construction 
of a dialogue that preserves the constitutional heritage of each state 
does not pass through silence but through the explicit 
differentiation between the constitutional parameter and 
conventional norms and the clear explanation of the reasons for a 
diverging interpretation42. 
On the other hand, when there is consistency and the use of 
Art. 117, par. 1, is avoided, the question on ‘substantive 
constitutional favour’ still stands, that is, whether the silent cases 
can be explained differently from constitutional patriotism. The 
answer is hypothetical because the evidence is not supported by the 
strict analysis of judicial legal reasoning or case law outcomes. 
First, focusing on the constitutional substantive parameters, 
silent cases underline a theory of constitution ‘as a whole, as a 
system, avoiding the fragmented interpretation of a single 
                                                 
42 G. Martinico, La giurisprudenza della disobbedienza. Il ruolo dei conflitti nel rapporto 
tra la Corte costituzionale e la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in A. Bernardi (ed.), 
I controlimiti. Primato delle norme europee e difesa dei principi costituzionali (2017), 
407-444, argues that what we call ‘discordant cases’, or judgement no. 49/2015, 
could be a way of ‘functional disobedience’ in so far as they imply a mutual 
recognition between courts. These cases entail a form of cooperation if the 
reasons of dissent are clear and well-explained, thus allowing scholars and the 
public opinion to control legal reasoning. 
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provision removed from its contextual relationship with the other 
principles, rules and rights enshrined in the Constitution’43. This 
opinion reflects a general path for cooperation and coordination 
together with the desire to maintain and protect the Italian 
constitutional core values and traditions. 
Second, the answer may not be as simple when adopting the 
legitimacy perspective. As previously mentioned, in principle, 
silent cases could serve a defensive approach, prioritising the 
national constitution even when its interpretation complies with 
the ECHR. However, the defensive approach may play in the 
opposite direction, protecting the ECHR itself. 
In recent years, there have been growing opinions across 
different states, suggesting an exit from the ECHR system and 
reaffirming a constitutional supremacy. Voices have been heard in 
the United Kingdom, following the conservative proposal to 
abolish the Human Rights Act, the law incorporating the ECHR into 
British legal order, and restore the Parliament’s sovereignty over 
British law. These voices have escalated to public opinions44. In 
France, some civil servants and intellectuals have proposed to make 
the binding force of ECHR less stringent45. Although minor 
opinions, these are signs of a disbanding involving not only 
populist parties seeking to address ordinary people with anti-
                                                 
43 M. Cartabia, Of Bridges and Walls: The ‘Italian Style’ of Constitutional Adjudication, 
cit. at 40, 52. 
44 See, for example, the campaign launched in 2011 by The Telegraph under the 
slogan ‘End the Human Rights Farce’ following cases in which foreign criminals 
used ‘the right to a family life under Article 8 ECHR to avoid deportation’. Other 
cases, such as giving prisoners the right to vote, have caused emotive reactions. 
In 2015, a Manifesto of the Conservatives aimed at abolishing the Human Right 
Act and introducing a British Bill of Rights, wishing to break the formal link 
between British Courts and ECtHR and make the Supreme Court the final arbiter 
in matters concerning human rights in the United Kingdom; the campaign 
remains on-going. Recently, The Telegraph affirmed that the United Kingdom’s 
plans to ‘scrap’ the Human Rights Act have been shelved until after Brexit 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/26/theresa-may-preparing-abandon-plans-
british-bill-rights-sources/, accessed May 8, 2018). 
45 See the Manifesto of the so-called ‘Groupe Plessis’, pseudonym for a group of 
French high-level officers, suggesting the exit of ECHR: ‘Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme: pourquoi en sortir est un impératif démocratique’ 
(http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/06/21/31001-20160621ARTFIG00149-cour-
europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-pourquoi-en-sortir-est-un-imperatif-
democratique.php, accessed May 8, 2018). 
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European rhetoric but also high-level officials. In this context, silent 
cases may serve another objective. Focusing on the Constitution 
and converting an ECHR violation into a substantive constitutional 
one, they could be a means to prevent the perception, in public 
opinion, of an unreasoned importation of judicial solutions. Thus, 
the incorporation of ECtHR interpretation directly into the 
substantive constitutional parameter is a way to protect the ECHR 
machinery itself. In times of mistrust, it is possible that the 
European human rights adjudication needs, today more than in the 
past, to be rooted in constitutional norms and have legitimacy from 
a constitutional background. In sum, implicit cooperation can grant 
and preserve the unity of the European transnational system of 
human rights protection. In fact, through their own parameters, 
national courts aim at complying with ECtHR jurisprudence, 
assuring the same level of protection, while rooting the legitimacy 
of European integration directly into their living Constitution. 
 
